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Problem Area 
 
In 1989 revolutions heralded the new age of democracy in Europe, but in the periphery of the old 
world a similar movement made the scene on Tiananmen Square, Beijing. The Square, located in 
the centre of Beijing, is in short one of the largest squares in the world and carries both cultural and 
historical importance to the Chinese. Here, however, things took a different turn. Where the former 
satellite states in Central Europe experienced freedom and emancipation from the USSR, the con-
frontational public movement in China experienced a morbid authoritarian repression. Thousands of 
killings were documented, and the protests were forced into silence (Lagerkvist, 2014). 
  
Albeit scholars have scrutinised the processual interaction between the leaders and the led in the 
context of 1989, the novel of contestation still seems inconclusive to us. Many have endeavoured to 
demystify the occurrence in Tiananmen Square by posing questions such as ‘How is a political and 
public space made?‘ (Lee, 2009) or trying to popularise it through comparative studies between the 
former Soviet states and the People’s Republic of China (Esherick and Wasserstrom, 1990). 
 
In this regard it is key to underscore how the phenomenon, Tiananmen Square, transmits meaning 
vested in the past and in the present within a single location. Furthermore it both ‘exists as a subject 
and as a social context’ in comprehensive webs of meaning (Hung, 2005: 13), and thusly it invites 
for a multidisciplinary research strategy grounded in an interpretive approach. However, consistent 
with Daniel Nehring’s interpretation of the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum’s work Not for 
Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities (2010), we believe that a study of social facts should 
be rooted in a creative frame of mind. Suggesting that an analysis of broader social, political and 
cultural issues that shape and are shaping, should inculcate ‘citizens to adopt an active, conscious 
role in society’ (Nehring and Plummer, 2013: 484).     
  
On that note – and in spite of the general uncertainty surrounding the contestation, which we will 
explore later in the theory and analytical chapters – we wish to embark upon an analytical explora-
tion dealing with the extant, ethical dimension of imaginations characteristic to Tiananmen Square 
and the conflictual narrative. Thereupon we propose an extensive search on the rituals of resistance 
and repression in order to identify the opposing schemes. 
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At this juncture we are inclined to read and interpret the contestation on the basis of the following 
three punctuations marked in the stream of history; 1919 in connection with the May Fourth 
Movement, 1949 and the inauguration of the People’s Republic of China, and 1989 touching on the 
occupation of Tiananmen Square. These inserted foci are to begin with what we, and authors such 
as Lee (2009), Thornton (2010), Hershkovitz (1993), and Hung (2005), judge as three pivotal points 
in the change and development of the various conflicting perspectives of meaning that a site can 
yield and produce. Additionally it is an attempt to separate the past from the present with the aim of 
creating a dynamic research established on flexibility on the one hand, and consistency and coher-
ence on the other. As the event of 1989 arguably ‘generated more controversy than consensus’ 
(Wasserstrom and Perry, 1992: 3), our aim is to understand the impact it has had on the spatial-
temporal dimension of Tiananmen Square. Concisely it means that we have an interest in what 
Tiananmen Square is, and we further desire to know how and why it is. By problematising the ways 
in which the Chinese Communist Party, the people, and the place interact, we will decode the mutu-
ality between the political, the social and the physical, and furthermore we will propose a tool with 
which to analyse the contestation of place. 
 
Pinning down an agreed timeline is a contestable task in this context, due to the very nature of place 
and space, as alteration takes shape through clash of perceptions. The type of political contestations 
and physical congregations that have occurred on Tiananmen Square have both started happening 
and changing in nature along with its spatial expansion. With this report, we wish to delve into the 
concepts of contested place and the process of meaning-making as it essentially contributes to how 
people make sense of their lives. 
From the timeline we have proposed, Tiananmen Square has changed from sharing imperial sacral-
ity with the Forbidden City, to; firstly, being historically recognised as a place where citizens can 
publicly air political discontent; and secondly, what was a ceremonial platform for the ruling party 
and still carries big cultural significance for the Chinese. Such is the case with meaningful places 
worldwide, these two traits are contradictory and yet, do not cancel out the presence of the other. As 
is relatable anywhere else in the world with meaningful locations, the collective memory of events 
associated with Tiananmen Square’s history cannot be easily shaken away, and they form the ac-
tions of both authoritative and layperson involved with the place. 
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Accumulating knowledge of the social patterns and processes scholars often seek to offer factual, 
systematic accounts, but risk to engender ‘static or monochromic portraits of Chinese culture’ 
(Wasserstrom and Perry, 1992: 4), which frequently derive from normative assessments of how so-
cial structures work. As the time and space surrounding us and our environment has a literal impact 
on how we live and perceive meaning, we find it important to explore and understand the context in 
which abstract space becomes a concrete place laden with meaning, and how space furthermore 
transforms through physical and practical forces. That said, we find the study of Tiananmen Square 
to be a good example of a tangible place which mirrors our interests, and thus we have settled on 
the following questions: 
 
Research Question and Working Questions 
 
 How has the perceptual meaning of Tiananmen Square as a contested place changed 
from 1919 onwards? 
 
o Did the May 4th movement in 1919 give impetus to Tiananmen Square as a public 
place? 
 
o How is the Chinese Communist Party’s annexation of Tiananmen Square in 1949 re-
flected in the contestation of the place? 
 
o How is the public movement’s appropriation of the Square in 1989 related to the 
contestation? 
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Methodology & Methods of the project 
 
In its core the following chapter explains the methodological propositions together with the analyt i-
cal framework established in the course of making this project. Additionally, this chapter will pro-
vide an epitome of the theory and a description of the select empirical material utilised. Moreover it 
elucidates and reflects upon a set of limitations identified in relation to the problem formulation and 
the material that we desire to explore, and in that regard the chapter will examine the consequences 
our choices have had on the study itself. Put in other words we aim to determine the boundaries of 
the project in order to explain the development of the conceptual design which form the backbone 
of the report. 
 
Theoretical perspectives 
Production of Space 
 
Through our research question, we convey the message that we wish to look further into the concept 
of contested of place, through the illustrative example of Tiananmen Square with a set timeframe of 
1919 and onwards, focusing on specific key events that hold importance to the meaning of space in 
said location. 
In order to analyse the perceptual meaning of space that has been given to Tiananmen Square – and 
whether differences in the meaning of the space occur between different actors - we are firstly going 
to utilise the theoretical framework of space and place created by Henri Lefebvre in his work ‘The 
Production of Space’. Through The Production of Space we will ground our theoretical knowledge 
regarding how space is transformed into meaningful places through the actions of people. We will, 
furthermore, look at the actual physicality (architecture) of Tiananmen Square, and how this was 
practiced by the publics and transformed into a place of meaning with clear social and political con-
notations. Space, Lefebvre argues, is more abstract in its meaning than place. Space is a physical 
area that has not achieved significant meaning through the interaction of people, and thusly it re-
mains largely impersonal and unbiased. Place, however, is space that has acquired value from per-
sonal affection or use through different actors (Lefebvre, 1991). 
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In Lefebvre’s work, The Production of Space (1974: 410-411), he concludes that the formation of 
social space does not exclude itself from other important aspects of the socio-political arena. In-
stead, he argues that social space appropriates resources and encompasses them to create a new 
meaning. Therefore, the production of social space, and that which social space represents, should 
no longer be looked upon as an independent factor in the social-political arena, but should rather be 
perceived as in synthesis with other factors. On the matter of social space Lefebvre states ; ‘Is space 
indeed a medium? A milieu? An intermediary? It is doubtless all of these, but its role is less and 
less neutral, more and more active, both as instrument and as a goal, as means and as end.’ (Le-
febvre, 1974: 411). Suggested by this quote, space is gradually becoming accepted as laden with 
meaning, and can no longer be viewed as an independent factor in reaching a goal, but rather as an 
important tool that integrates itself in interdisciplinary studies.    
 
Contested place 
 
Following the build-up of a theoretical framework of space and place, we wish to proceed by 
grounding the concept of contested place in said framework. In order to understand how space can 
become contested, it is important to understand how place initially takes form, thusly the concept of 
contested place derives from the theoretical framework set by Henri Lefebvre. 
 
To further elaborate on the concept of contested place, we will draw upon the work Contested 
Worlds by Martin Phillips, professor of human geography. Contestation – often manifested in vio-
lence – takes many shapes and forms. Although violence provides a clear sign of contestation, it is 
important to realise that it merely portrays the most obvious of contestations, in which groups of 
people directly clash with one another. 
Social contestation that occurs amongst people with differing ideals may further be portrayed 
through ‘ideological debates and conflict’ (Philips, 2005: 3). Furthermore, Phillips importantly ar-
gues that social contests are largely geographical, in that space is often contested as various groups 
of people
1
 seek to utilise it for their own assigned purposes, thereby occupying a specific space. In 
accordance with this, the various groups of people may attempt to exclude their counterparts from 
                                                             
1 In relation to this project we refer to the Chinese publics and state 
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the specific places they have chosen to represent themselves through. Social contestation is there-
fore often found to be manifested in spatial characteristics (Ibid). 
Furthering the thought of contestation being bound to geographical and spatial traits, politics - read 
ideologies - distinctively uses space in all shapes and sizes, ranging from the figurative borders of a 
country, to municipalities, to certain areas, such as a square, as representatives of power or govern-
mental ambitions (Phillips, 2005). As people become attached to specific places and imbue them 
with a collective public meaning, contestation may occur if changes are made in respect to what the 
government wishes for the space(s) to represent (Ibid). 
 
In the research question put forth we show our initial bias by assuming that Tiananmen Square is a 
place of contested meanings. Thusly, we aim to utilise contested place as a conceptual lens, with 
which we can focus our research on an investigation of the meaning(s) invested in Tiananmen 
Square. Specifically, we will be looking at select events, such as the May Fourth Movement in 
1919, the change to a Socialist regime in 1949, and the student protests in 1989. We do this in order 
to identify conflicts between the governmental elite and the protesters (the publics) that may portray 
the difference in the meaning they invest in Tiananmen Square as a socio-political arena. 
Furthermore, our analytical approach will be shaped by an interdisciplinary use of the geographical 
imagination and sociological imagination. We aim to understand contested place both in its raw 
physical shape and its social sense. 
 
Dimensions of Contestation: Physical, Practical and Metaphysical 
 
Taking our point of departure in Lefebvre’s theoretical framework and the concept of contested 
place, we have additionally distinguished three sub-dimensions on which to base and specify our 
analytical approach: physical, practical and metaphysical
2
. In continuation of these three sub-
dimensions we aim to understand the theoretical facets of the parallel development of Tiananmen 
Square which might branch off into new patterns of meaning through the interactive relations of the 
sub-dimensions. Furthermore, they will play an important role in bringing forth and casting light 
upon the complexity of contested place.  
                                                             
2 Also referred to as ideology 
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We arrived at this conceptual tool through our readings of both the theory presented by Lefebvre, 
on how space is produced, as well as the empirical material revealing the nature of the contestation 
entrenched in Tiananmen Square. The various articles we deal with primarily delve into one of the 
three concepts that we have amalgamated in order to provide a holistic account of the contestation. 
In this sense it is not a framework entirely of our own making, but rather a selection of concepts 
previously established and used in synthesis with each other. 
 
In doing so we provide a physical overview of the space of Tiananmen Square, and the physical fea-
tures’ processual change over time; as in The May Fourth Movement of 1919, the shift of govern-
ment in 1949 and following the student protests in 1989 and until more recent times. The physical 
features that will be looked into are of architectural significance; how the space is arranged within 
the square and the physical objects that it embodies will be of importance here. We will look into 
whether any changes to the physical features carry noteworthy meaning to the contestation of the 
place. 
Through the practical use of space we will look further into how both the government and the pub-
lics interact with both each other and the space itself, through for example parades and political 
ceremonies from the governments’ perspective, and protests and celebrations from the publics’ 
viewpoint. The practical dimension will allow us to investigate how the different actors operate 
within Tiananmen Square, and whether their actions are in alignment with each other, or whether 
they clash and create challenges to the perceived meaning of the space as seen by both the govern-
ment and the protesters. 
The metaphysical or ideological element carries the importance of considering the meanings that 
the two actors vest in Tiananmen Square. Here it is vital to note how the metaphysical aspect most 
often becomes explicit through the physical and/or the practical features of space. Meaning is thusly 
bound in both physical and practical uses of space, such as propaganda put forth by the government 
either through physical objects or through political agendas. Likewise, the protesters advocate ideas 
of democracy and freedom through their interaction with the physicality of the space and through 
their practical actions, such as the protests themselves. 
Through an analysis of these three elements of space, it will be possible to gain a great insight into 
the meanings vested in Tiananmen Square, and how it came to be a contested place. They will fur-
ther work to provide more depth to the analysis as they will enable us to cover several aspects of 
contested place, by inspecting both the physical and the social landscape, as well as the narratives 
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and meanings that may present themselves through the metaphysical aspect. Collectively will pro-
vide us with a better understanding of how the different layers of space interact with each other to 
create meanings.  
 
Distinguishing between the three sub dimensions is rather difficult, as we fundamentally find them 
to be overlapping in nature. However, the report will be composed by the three main chapters; 
1919: The Force Awakens, 1949: The Party Strikes Back, and 1989: Attack of The Publics which 
respectively focus on the physical, the metaphysical and the practical use of Tiananmen Square. The 
chapter on 1919 will thusly provide the reader with a primarily physical overview of the spatial 
changes that occurred in Beijing during the Republican. It aims to highlight the importance of these 
physical developments in understanding the contestation of the Square. The chapter on 1949 ex-
plores the metaphysical mind mapping of the Chinese Communist Party, in order to provide the 
reader with a strong sense of political and cultural connotations that may be imbued in the place and 
its perceptual meaning. Lastly the chapter on 1989 offers a perspective on the practical manifesta-
tion and interaction with Tiananmen Square, and so the Trinitarian relation is completed. Due to the 
overlapping nature mentioned above, each chapter will inevitably relate to the three conceptualisa-
tions, but with a primary focus on a singular dimension.  
 
Methodological perspectives 
Interdisciplinarity, Constructivism and Interpretivism      
    
Initially the study is grounded in a multidisciplinary approach, integrating the relevant disciplines of 
human geography and sociology, which support a critical understanding of the available literature. 
Moreover this specific combination allows an exploration of the complex reciprocal relation be-
tween space and social practices.  
Starting from a constructivist perspective with The Production of Place as our main intellectual 
framework, we strive to establish a holistic qualitative account of the processual development of 
Tiananmen Square. The holistic practice - grounded in our conceptual framework PPM - will ensure 
a comprehensive linkage between our methodology and methods, and thus work as the ‘research 
nexus’ (Hesse-Biber and Patricia, 2011: 7). Our interpretive research strategy will focus on the in-
teractions between humans and objects in the context of Tiananmen Square from 1919 onwards. 
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The holistic approach will be what links our research strategy with our our content analysis focus-
ing on the construction of narratives and the annexation of the physical place. Concisely the content 
analysis will be focusing on Tiananmen Square as an illustrative example of contested place and 
how contestation takes shape in certain places. 
 
Having established this frame of reference we find it relevant to incorporate, or perhaps better, re-
flect upon the Weberian conceptualisation of Verstehen, which engages with context-specific mean-
ing and people’s interpretation of individual and collective experiences (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 
2005). In prolongation of Weber’s philosophy, the world perceived by the spectator is a social con-
struct grounded in agents’ ‘membership in communities of meaning’, which according to theory is 
mediated by the Kantian notion of a priori knowledge (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2005: 10). To 
quote the anthropologist Clifford Geertz: ‘believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal sus-
pended in webs of significance he himself spun, I take [...] the analysis of [those] webs to be there-
fore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning’ 
(Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2005: 6). 
Following this chain of thought our theoretical writing deliberately distances itself from the positiv-
ist idea of universality and predictability in regards to human behaviour. Truth is contested, and so 
evidence cannot necessarily manifest itself in the observational world since perception is filtered 
and shaped in relation to the minds which interpret the social webs (Yanow, and Schwartz-Shea, 
2005). Videlicet we reject “common-knowledge” and hence do not claim to generate a model mir-
rored in the material world. Senses are without interpretation nonsense, and so the purpose of this 
paper is to understand and make sense out of the empirical material. Inasmuch the study calls for a 
dynamic processual research that calls for more than one possible interpretation of meaning. 
 
Hermeneutic Tradition 
 
To perform the previous mentioned content analysis we will partly draw on sources engaging with 
the architectural planning of Tiananmen Square, and furthermore we will look into other research-
ers’ interpretation and portrayal of the narratives surrounding the site. 
With this frame of reference we are able to work qualitatively in the hermeneutic tradition, but with 
a somewhat nonpartisan relation to the empirical data. In lines with the hermeneutic rationale we do 
not recognise meaning as a direct expression. Artefacts e.g. the Monument of the People’s Heroes 
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in Tiananmen Square must project a constructed web of meaning as they are not completely exter-
nal to the individual’s mind; rather they are entangled between the consciousness and practice of the 
agents involved with the artefacts (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2005). On that note our interpretive 
research voids direct unmediated observation, since expression of meaning - from our vantage point 
- entails an iterative sense-making through the revision of provisional interpretations.  
 
Thus in the light of the hermeneutic nature we will not generate new data, but rather reinterpret 
what is already at our disposal so as to identify a new angle of approach. This enables us to study 
potential patterns and societal themes produced in the Chinese culture, and so we unravel the proc-
esses exposed in the pre-existing data. Doing so will enable us to apply our conceptual framework 
in an attempt to re-examine previous interpretations of Tiananmen Square and the monuments that 
it encompasses.  
Evidently our choices and presumptions related to the existing material are – as alluded to earlier - 
bound to shape the process, but by going in and out of the analysis we strive to channel new knowl-
edge independent of manipulation and subjective judgements (Hesse-Biber and Patricia, 2011). 
 
Perspectives and Delimitations 
 
By applying the concept of contested place to our analytical investigation of Tiananmen Square as 
an illustrative case; we are able to delve into the select history and trace the Square’s process of 
production and representation. Our aim is to understand how the inflicted meaning has been con-
tested and changed through various, but all the same similar, practices. Inherently this implies a re-
search design reflecting individual as well as collective experience, and in this fashion the analysis 
is going to educate how ‘cultural forms are created and projected’ within the scope of Beijing, 
China (Hesse-Biber and Patricia, 2011: 229). Ultimately it is imperative to mention how our objec-
tive is to reveal the assumptions within the contextual frame of Tiananmen Square, and not to agi-
tate one indisputable truth. Here it is noteworthy how political propaganda is a consistent feature of 
the mass produced meaning vested in Tiananmen Square, but pondering the various perspectives on 
the problem formulation we deliberately refrain from judging the actual socialisation process where 
truth is created through discourse (Cresswell, 2009). In this regard it is in place to mention how we 
intentionally omit a rigorous separation between politics, culture and place as one is not completely 
abstract from another.   
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In terms of biases our ontological stand is - in accordance with the legacy of Lefebvre - that place is 
a product of human practice, and so interaction must be prior to place. By means of this the episte-
mological considerations are with the meaning of place rather than the experience of place, which 
eventually determine the study’s end.   
 
In conjunction with the above it seems logical to mention that none of the students behind this pro-
ject have any strong affiliation to the Chinese society, and so the viewpoint presented throughout 
the report will be that of an outsider. Considering the innate limitations of our western inheritance, 
our linguistic (in)capabilities force us to rely on translated texts or texts written by English speaking 
scholars. Irrefutably this constraining barrier involves certain disadvantages in terms of access to 
Chinese literature and inside knowledge, and so we are intrinsically restricted to ground our argu-
mentation in a western-influenced field of research. Sources that we might have applied count 
‘Tiananmen guangchang de guihua he sheji [The planning and design of Tiananmen Square]’ by 
Wu, L. (1979), and ‘Tiananmen guangchang: Cong gongting guangchang dao renmin guangchang 
de yanbian he gaizao [Tiananmen Square: evolution and transformation from imperial square to 
people’s square]’ by Hou, R. (1984). 
 
That is one of the reasons for us not to investigate the pure cultural connotations to the protests, but 
rather the concept of contested place with an interest in the objective environment and its relation to 
the inconsistent narratives constructed by the elites and the publics. Here we talk about the term 
“publics” with relation to the conceptual framework put forth by Forest, Johnson & Till (2004). 
They argue that public memory, the creation of meaning substantiated in space, is not the mere re-
sult of an encompassing singular elite-public dichotomy, rather, it manifests itself through an array 
of publics and elites that contest with each other to create meaning. In prolongation to this, we will 
utilise the term to talk about the publics, however due to the fundamental singularity of the Chinese 
Communist Party, we see it difficult to differentiate between the elites and will therefore not aim to 
do so
3
. 
 
                                                             
3
 Note that we do differentiate between using public as a term with its original meaning, and the concept of publics as 
presented in the paragraph 
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Selection of sources 
 
In terms of data we utilise various sources providing different and occasionally opposing view-
points in order to secure a comprehensive empirical foundation for our analysis. To name a few, 
Sollinger for instance argues that the 1989 movement was innately democratic (1989), Colhoun 
questions whether it was democratic (1997), and Wasserstrom states that ‘it would be hasty to asso-
ciate “minzhu”4 with any conventional western notion of democracy’ (1992: 30). This being said, 
the previously mentioned authors agree upon the contested nature of Tiananmen Square imposed 
upon it through the interactions of the publics and the state. 
 
Hence the work will compose a synergy where books, journal articles, and architectural plans sup-
port the overall argument of contested place. In the context of our project, the actual socio-political 
reasons that were involved in bringing about the demonstrations and protests on Tiananmen Square 
are not our main research priority. The majority of our sources in this project will therefore be com-
prised of both primary historical sources and peer-reviewed secondary sources, mainly journal arti-
cles and books. Our angle of approach is to avoid taking up too much of a historical slant, but to 
rather focus on the changing of perception and narratives connected to a certain place, using 
Tiananmen Square as means to represent/illustrate our theories. 
 
The following part will exemplify and elaborate how each type of data will be applied to the report, 
and further it will evaluate the consequences the specific use of data has had to our project: 
Books will be adopted as primary reading on the selected historical events, but further they will 
provide a more extensive understanding of the analytical and theoretical perspectives related to our 
research question. Particularly The Production of Space by the Marxist philosopher and Sociologist 
Henri Lefebvre (1991) will help us to operationalise the notions of space and place, and further, the 
compilation of articles The Power of Place by Agnew and Duncan (1989) together with Contested 
Worlds: An Introduction to Human Geography by Martin Phillips (2005) will facilitate an interpre-
tation of our primary concept contested place. Remaking Beijing: Tiananmen Square and the Crea-
tion of a Political Space by Wu Hung (2005), professor in art history, is another main source con-
tributing with detailed information on the construction of the Monument to the People’s Heroes and 
                                                             
4 Minzhu translates into Rule of the People 
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the symbolic traits of the Goddess of Democracy. Wu Hung also explores the meaning of time in 
relation to Tiananmen Square. 
Journal articles will provide us with a subtle portrayal of the social-constellation in question to-
gether with a critical understanding of how the universally applicable idea of space and place has 
been employed differently by various scholars. To unravel the complexity of the power-struggle 
pertinent to Tiananmen Square we will, through Tiananmen Square and the politics of place by 
Linda Hershkovitz, former faculty member of the Department of Geography at Toronto University 
(1993), examine the architectural development and layout of the Square, and how it became a po-
litically loaded place. Furthermore, articles like How is a political public space made? - The birth of 
Tiananmen Square and the May Fourth Movement by the PhD in political science Nelson K. Lee 
(2009), will enable ourselves to gain an insight into how Tiananmen Square became a public place 
through the use of its space by protesters, and the spatial changes that occurred in Beijing prior to 
1919. Relating the symbolism of the Square to time we additionally engage with the article Time by 
Barbara Adam (2006), professor in social sciences. 
Chapter on 1919: The Force Awakens  
 
The following chapter aims to capture the physical - structural and architectural - development of 
Beijing, and the spatial changes that took place during the beginning of the republican era. Essen-
tially, the chapter will discuss some of the structural changes that occurred to the city’s layout at the 
end of the Imperial era, and what these meant to the creation of Tiananmen Square as a public 
place. Furthermore, it will link these physical changes to the events of the May Fourth Movement, 
and how the two played together in shaping Tiananmen Square from being an empty space to being 
a politically loaded place. It is important to note that the pivotal point of this chapter is not to pre-
sent the reader with a detailed historical overview of Beijing and the changes it underwent, or the 
specific historical details of the May Fourth Movement. Rather, it is to present to the reader the im-
portance of certain spatial changes and link them to the social interactions with Tiananmen Square 
as observed through the May Fourth Movement. Hence the chapter will be dedicated to the concep-
tualisation of the physical dimension from our theoretical framework. 
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Imperial Beijing & the Spatial Development 
 
Imperial Beijing originated primarily from the era of the Ming Dynasty, which had taken over the 
capital of Yuan that had been founded by Khubilai Khan in 1267 (Thornton, 2010). The city was 
reconstructed in 1420 by the Yonglo Emperor
5
 according to a spatial layout following a strict Chi-
nese cosmographic design in order to signify the end of an era of foreign control (Lee, 2009; Agnew 
& Duncan, 1989: 203). The cosmographic design ensured that the emperor was designated as the 
‘Son of Heaven’ placed at the axis mundi, the “centre of the world”, of Beijing. The cosmographic 
layout consisted of three primary ‘cities’ that subsided within one another. Innermost lay the For-
bidden City, in which the Imperial Palace was located. Encircling the Forbidden City was the Impe-
rial City, which itself was surrounded by the Outer City. Collectively the Forbidden City and the 
Imperial City were known as the Inner City. The spatial structure of Inner and Outer City worked as 
a scheme of dividing the commoner and the imperial, the sacred and the sacrilegious, “a continuum 
of spaces of decreasing sacrality as one moved outward” (Hershkovitz, 1993: 403). An architectural 
hierarchy was thusly established from which the emperor, located at the centre of the city, exerted 
‘earthly virtue and power’ (Agnew & Duncan, 1989: 203). 
The hierarchical structure of the city was in particular upheld by the strategically placed walls: the 
nine gates of the Inner City and the seven of the Outer City that acted as restrictive channels and as 
a mechanism of social control throughout the city (Hershkovitz, 1993). 
 
The gate leading into the Imperial City was called Tiananmen
6
 (See Fig. 1, A). It was through 
Tiananmen that the emperor(s) of the imperial times “appeared” during the annual ceremonial ac-
knowledgement of the publics, and furthermore acted as the place where commandments were is-
sued (Thornton, 2010). However, neither the emperor nor the publics were present during the cere-
monial event, and thus Tiananmen carried no substantial meaning to the people and acted merely as 
an image of symbolic value between ruler and subjects (Lee, 2009). 
                                                             
5 Third emperor of the Ming Dynasty and ruled from 1402-1424. 
6
 Tiananmen translates into ’Gate of Heavenly peace’, and should not be confused with Tiananmen Square, which is the space (square) 
located in front of Tiananmen. 
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Fig. 1. “Beijing in early 20th century: City walls, gates, new roads and public parks. Places of importance: A: Tiananmen; B: Chinese Gate; C: Front 
Gate; D: Chang’an Avenue; E: Front Gate Main Street; F: Central Park; G: The Forbidden City; H: Altar of Agriculture Park; I: Scenic Hill; J: 
North Lake; K: Central and South Lakes; L: New China Gate; M: Lake of Ten Temples; N: Legation Quarter” (Jiu Jin Da Guan, 1992: 10, as cited in 
Lee, 2009). 
 
As the Imperial era culminated towards the end of the 19
th
 century, the spatial structure of Beijing 
proceeded to undergo change. With the revolution and the abdication of the last emperor on the 12
th
 
of February, 1912 the strict imperial and cosmographic layout of the city was abandoned in favour 
of a more modernised structure (Agnew & Duncan, 1989: 204). First and foremost the movement of 
the publics across the city was revitalised through the opening of the roads and the previously 
strictly controlled gates – it was in fact only the Front Gate that remained closed and under strict 
observation (Lee, 2009). One of the most essential roads to be opened to the public was Chang’an 
Avenue, which ran perpendicularly to Tiananmen (see Fig. 1, D)(Lee, 2009; Hershkovitz, 1993). 
The opening of Chang’an Avenue in 1913 meant that the place that formerly constituted the private 
square of the Forbidden City in front of Tiananmen was now open for public use as well, and the 
avenue furthermore continued to develop into a key location in Beijing, sprawling with people (Lee, 
2009). 
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During the imperial era and the strict cosmographic spatial layout of Beijing, most parks, squares 
and scenic places in the city that provided a spacious environment for gatherings, were located in 
restricted areas within the Imperial City and the Forbidden City. Towards the end of the Qing dy-
nasty, the last imperial dynasty to rule China, and at the start of the new republican period in 1912, 
the focus of the spatial layout of Beijing shifted towards catering more to the public. In order to 
provide more services for the common people of the city, public parks and leisure areas were cre-
ated, and previously private parks, such as Central Park (See Fig. 1, F), were made public (Lee, 
2009). The newly opened public places quickly developed into locations highly utilised for a range 
of activities, be they of “education, entertainment, commercial, cultural, social, or even political” 
status (Ibid: 35). However, the public parks were not entirely unrestricted as an entrance fee was 
imposed upon those who wished to enter and utilise the facilities and spaces that the parks and areas 
of leisure presented. Therefore the public parks were primarily used by middle to upper class cit i-
zens (Ibid). 
 
The May Fourth Movement 
 
On May the fourth in 1919, student protests with a political agenda occurred in Beijing. Over 3000 
strong, the students rallied together in order to display their dissatisfaction towards the hesitance of 
the Chinese government in regard to the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I 
(Hershkovitz, 1993). During the negotiations of the Paris Peace Conference, Japan was awarded 
with a formerly Chinese city, Qingdao located in Shandong, which had been occupied by the Ger-
mans during the war – and the failure of the Chinese government to reclaim this territory during the 
discussion of the Treaty led the public to accuse them of having struck a financial deal with the 
Japanese. It was the lack of national interest shown by the republican Beijing government that gave 
birth to the May Fourth Movement in 1919 – a movement whose agenda was for the public to voice 
their cultural and political concerns (Lee, 2009). Initially the movement was primarily concerned 
with issues threatening Chinese sovereignty, and was largely a movement with strong patriotic con-
notations (Wasserstrom, 1990). 
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The May Fourth Movement was one of the earliest mobilisations of the common people to carry 
forth a political agenda in modern China
7
, and gave stimuli to future political movements. The Chi-
nese Communist Party itself indeed claims that the patriotic, political and intellectual characteristics 
of the May Fourth Movement shaped scholars of radical intellectual thought, leading to success of 
the revolution and creation of the Party in 1949 (Ibid: 9). Furthermore, the movement played a vital 
role in establishing a ‘spatial practice to which virtually all subsequent protest movements (up to 
and including 1989) made self-conscious reference’ (Hershkovitz, 1993: 406). The spatial practice 
that the May Fourth Movement constituted regards the use of the empty space outside of Tianan-
men, which today is known as Tiananmen Square. 
 
Tiananmen Square is in contemporary time commonly known to have been the most popular venue 
for protesters to gather at due to its attained symbolic value of patriotism and revolution. However, 
it has not always been so. Prior to the May Fourth Movement, the Square, which at the time was 
referred to as ‘empty space’ (Lee, 2009; Hershkovitz 1993), held no specific significance to either 
the public or the government; the empty space in front of Tiananmen had acted as a private square 
during the imperial times, and was thusly inaccessible to the public, meaning that they had no ties to 
the place - it merely carried the symbolic values of the sacredness of the emperor. Following the 
end of the dynasties and the move towards the republican era, the empty space became accessible in 
1913 with the opening of Chang’an Avenue as mentioned earlier, and the symbolic value of sacred-
ness was lost in the ideological switch (Lee, 2009). 
 
In comparison to the Front Gate, New China Gate and Central Park, Tiananmen Square did not hold 
the same level of political importance in 1919 – yet the students of the May Fourth Movement 
chose to utilise the empty space of the square for their protest on the fourth of May. The following 
sub-chapter aims to investigate and analyse why Tiananmen Square was chosen, and what conse-
quences this had for the space. 
 
 
 
                                                             
7 Modern China refers to the early Republican era after the abdication of the last emperor in 1912. 
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The Choice of Tiananmen Square 
 
After Central Park was made public in 1915, it functioned as one of the most important political and 
intellectual locations in Beijing. The park was used by the adversarial political elites to host demon-
strations and protests, and as a place where concerns were voiced. One of the major adversarial el-
ites to utilise the space of Central Park for political purposes was the Citizens’ Diplomatic Associa-
tion (Lee, 2009). The functionality of Central Park as a public space did however carry several limi-
tations; the parks were only semi-public as the government issued control over them. If the govern-
ment wished for the parks to be closed, they would be so, and the elected members of the board of 
directors for each park were well established people with a healthy relationship with the govern-
ment (Ibid). Furthermore, the Citizens’ Diplomatic Association and other social and polit ical or-
ganisations required an entrance permission issued by the police in order to carry forth a meeting in 
the park(s) (Ibid). Lastly, as previously mentioned, an entrance fee was imposed upon those who 
wished to enter the parks – regardless of their intended purpose and use. As a result of this, only 
wealthy organisations that could pay for the attendants (primarily in order to allow low-class citi-
zens to attend), such as the Citizens’ Diplomatic Association, were capable of hosting public dem-
onstrations within Central Park (and other public parks) (Ibid). 
 
Petitions, specifically, were popularly held near the New China Gate (see Fig. 1, L). Over the 
course of 1918-19, several petitions took place, organised by students; on the 21
st
 of May, 1918, 
over 2000 students had gathered, and several of such events continued to take place during 1919 
(Lee, 2009). Lee does note, however, that there appeared to be a slight affiliation between Tianan-
men and the New China Gate, showing that Tiananmen was of less political importance to the pub-
lic and the government; On the fifth of June, 1919, several hundreds of female students had gath-
ered outside of Tiananmen, from where they continued to advance forth to the New China Gate to 
appease a petition to the president. Moreover, demonstrators that were arrested at New China Gate 
would be sent to Tiananmen to be apprehended, indicating the lesser importance of Tiananmen as a 
political site (2009). 
 
The May Fourth Movement was no wealthy organisation; rather, it was a collection of students 
from thirteen different schools, and therefore faced limitations in its choice of public avenues to 
utilise for its demonstrations. However, the previously highlighted spatial changes to Beijing im-
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bued the students with a wider variety of choices in terms of public space. The opening of Chang’an 
Avenue had meant that Tiananmen now functioned as the intersection between the major roads 
from each cardinal direction of the city. The thirteen schools from which the students came were 
primarily placed in the northernmost part of the Outer City and the more southern parts of the Inner 
City – for which reason Tiananmen acted as the fundamental crossroad between the schools (Lee, 
2009). The beneficial traits of Tiananmen as an avenue of public demonstrations over Central Park 
and New China Gate proved to be quite essential to the May Fourth Movement. Unlike Central 
Park, the empty space in front of Tiananmen was not semi-public, in the sense that it did not enforce 
an entry fee upon the public, and nor did it require a permit to socialise or gather there. Further-
more, in contrast to both the Central Park and the New China Gate, Tiananmen had at the time not 
yet claimed itself as a politically active space, and was therefore less strictly overlooked by the gov-
ernment. Importantly, the square also provided the students with more than adequate space in which 
they could gather (Ibid). The combination of all these factors resulted in the space in front of 
Tiananmen to be chosen as the gathering point for the demonstrations by the May Fourth Move-
ment in 1919. 
In the final sub-chapter we will link the findings presented in the overall chapter of 1919 to the 
theoretical framework set by Lefebvre, and discuss the importance of the spatial changes made to 
Beijing, alongside the impact that the May Fourth Movement had on Tiananmen Square. For this, 
we will furthermore draw upon some of the conclusions made by the authors used through the chap-
ter. 
 
Birth of Tiananmen Square & Theoretical discussion 
 
Thornton (2010), Lee (2009) and Hershkovitz (1993) all agree that the demonstrations on the fourth 
of May in 1919 at the empty space outside of Tiananmen provided the space with the initial impetus 
to become the social and political place known as Tiananmen Square. Following the events of the 
first large-scale demonstration that was held by the May Fourth Movement on the 4
th
 of May in 
1919 at Tiananmen Square, the majority of public protests proceeded to be held at the Square. 
Thirty-thousand students gathered at the Square on November the 29
th
 in 1919 to voice their con-
cern against foreign military interaction by Japan in the Fujian Province of China; on the 7
th
 of De-
cember, over a hundred-thousand people gathered to protest against the same incident (Lee, 2009). 
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Any given space that is not considered empty is a vessel of substance, but is itself not a substance. 
This, however, does not mean that the space is simply an abstraction – rather, as it remains a vessel 
of substance it implies that space “is not a thing but rather a set of relations between things” (Le-
febvre, 1991: 83). To specify, space, albeit not a thing, maintains and disguises social relationships. 
Furthering this thought, spaces are produced through social activities and the actions between actor 
and space – in this sense, space may arise from political, social or even economic conducts of activ-
ity. Space is thereby considered a physical actuality created from the earth, yet is also interrelated 
with the practical forces imposed upon it. Lefebvre sees this space as both a product of consump-
tion, but also as a producer that cannot be detached from technology and physical changes, or the 
social interactions that metaphysically shapes the space, nor can it be separated ‘from the state and 
the superstructures of society’ (1991: 85). Social space thusly eventuates, or crystallises through 
‘encounter, assembly and simultaneity’ of everything that exists within the space – natural or socie-
tal – as a product of contestation or harmony between humans, materials and monuments (Lefebvre, 
1991: 101). 
 
As was presented in the beginning of the chapter, Tiananmen Square during the imperial times 
merely served as a symbolic space of sacredness, disassociated from the publics that had no access 
to the Square. As noted above, social space and meaning creation is substantiated in the interaction 
of people, publics and elites, and their harmonious or contesting ideals. Therefore we argue that 
whilst the Square acted as a symbolic space – in the sense that the figurative bond between the em-
peror and his subjects was presented there, through the communication of a symbolic space – it did 
not function as a social and public space vested with meaning. As Wu Hung (2005: 58) notes, the 
ruler and subjects communicated through the symbolic value of Tiananmen, however neither were 
physically present at the space and so ‘Tiananmen both concealed and exhibited […] the imperial 
power’. It seems clear that the restrictive and hierarchal nature of the spatial layout of imperial Bei-
jing that functioned as a social control mechanism disabled the publics from interacting with 
Tiananmen Square – and therein lies the utter importance of the spatial changes that occurred dur-
ing the early Republican era, to the creation of Tiananmen Square as a political public space. Lee 
(2009) argues that without the spatial and architectonic changes such as the opening of Chang’an 
Avenue and other roads and parks – the modernisation of the city – it would be hard to imagine that 
the May Fourth Movement would have succeeded in their actions, if even existed. It is, for example, 
for this reason that we find the investigation of the space’s physical features pivotal in order to un-
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derstand how social space and meaning is created. Without an understanding of how spatiality re-
lates to practice, is it difficult to fully capture the idea of social space and how it may be contested. 
 
Another concept that is important to note in the discussion of the rise of Tiananmen Square as a 
public and political place is that of re-appropriation of space. A space which already has a place in 
existence may indeed be drawn from its ‘original purpose and the raison d’être which determines 
its forms, functions and structures; it may thus in a sense become vacant, and susceptible of being 
diverted, re-appropriated and put to a use quite different from its original one’ (Lefebvre, 1991: 
167). We believe that this was precisely what happened to Tiananmen Square as it transgressed 
from being a private square, to empty space, to finally being re-appropriated by the actions of the 
May Fourth Movement into being a political public space. The actions of the Movement at Tianan-
men Square in 1919, as Thornton (2010), Hershkovitz (1993) and Wu Hung (2005: 61) argue, 
thereby gave impetus to the production of the Square as a new political space that had grown into a 
different order of its previous version, starting a new era of public opinion rooted in the Square. 
In the following chapter we will look more into how the Chinese Communist Party attempted to 
dominate the space following the 1949 revolution and re-appropriate the space to be in line with its 
goals. 
 
Sub conclusion 
 
When the dynastic era came to an end in 1912, the spatial architectonics of the city of Beijing 
changed drastically, moving away from the hierarchical structure that placed the emperor as the axis 
mundi. Without the physical changes explored in the chapter that opened up and modernised the 
city, it seems unlikely that the May Fourth Movement would have been able to gather at Tiananmen 
Square as a place of public status, and imbue it with meaning through their political and cultural 
demonstrations. It therefore seemed essential to include and investigate the physicality of space 
when talking about how Tiananmen Square came to be a political public space, and furthermore 
how it came to be contested. 
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Chapter on 1949: The Party Strikes Back 
In prolongation to the temporal trajectories presented in the problem area  the following chapter will 
succinctly cover the proceedings of 1949. More concretely it will frame the metaphysical space cre-
ated by the Chinese Communist Party together with the fundamental ideological schism characteris-
tic of the time.  Additionally the chapter will dive into the geographical and sociological webs of 
meaning surrounding the inauguration of the People’s Republic of China, and the political annexa-
tion of Tiananmen Square which mirrors physical, practical and metaphysical aspects. Primarily, 
however, the target of the chapter will be to explore the metaphysical dimension pertinent to the 
contestation. This with regards to the Monument to the People’s Heroes in tandem with the imple-
mentation of Beijing time as ‘harmony between time and space [traditionally] was the foundation 
of rulership over a unified country’ (Hung, 2003: 109).  
The inauguration of the People’s Republic of China 
In the aftermath of the revolution the CCP claimed Beijing and its cultural inheritance; Mao’s por-
trait displayed on Tiananmen sealed the new political forces’ relation with the place. The successive 
official celebrations – which were executed on the square - arguably tied the people with the gov-
ernment, and so the secular, Trinitarian relation between government, place and people was estab-
lished (Hung, 2005). 
Evidently this argument could be challenged, but in consideration of the vast number of scholars 
agreeing to this proposal of a ‘new zero’ (Hung, 2005; Gittings, 1989) and the aim of our analysis, 
this constellation will not be questioned further in this project. Rather we intend to explore the par-
ticularity of representation together with the symbolic language which allows the agents identified 
in the research to mediate between their minds and to contest the meaning imposed by the other. On 
that note it is relevant to acknowledge the interdependency between politics, culture and place, as a 
separation of these could risk diminishing their significance to the present analysis. In other words 
this chapter will not rely on exclusive differentiations between the underlying intentions of a given 
practise or thought, but rather it will shed light on the conflict this practice or thought might encour-
age. 
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To return focus, Tiananmen Square was supposed to manifest the presence of the newly-ruling 
Party into the symbolic seat of China’s leadership (Hung, 2007). Inspired by Moscow’s Red Square 
(Thornton, 2010), Mao had a vision of a people’s square for a people’s state, and in order to realise 
this centre of attention, Tiananmen Square was already enlarged two months prior the proclamation 
of the new PRC in 1949. Additionally the Square underwent major reconstruction in the early 1950s 
as the space was not sufficiently large or accessible for the marches and national bi-annual parades 
that were planned. Surrounding structures like walls and decorative arches were torn down to make 
space. Mao wanted it to be able to fit ‘a billion people’ (Dutton et al., 2008: 24). 
By 1959, the square stretched a whopping 440,000 square meters wide, 160,000 smaller than its 
current size (Hung, 2007). In keeping with its ceremonial purpose, there were no amenities like 
benches or trees. The vast stretch of paved flatness was not for socialization or leisure, but to look 
forward in one direction towards Tiananmen and the once Forbidden City. Raised above the masses 
in person and in portrait, Mao was the personification of the revolution and had to see, and more 
importantly, be seen, by the crowds in the square. If one could not see him for the distance, there 
was his forward-facing portrait casting his gaze over everyone in the square (Lee, 2011). 
With reference to the expansion of the Square, the state-run press depict the process as a ‘spontane-
ous mass movement’ involving more than a thousand architects and engineers (Thornton, 2010: 
304). The metamorphosis of Tiananmen Square hence resembled the foundation of a revolutionary, 
united China, and so it served as a socialist vehicle in architectonic form. The only recognised 
party, the CCP, strived to make space for the only recognised class, the proletariat, and so all geo-
graphical and social diversity seemed to be ignored (Thornton, 2010). 
In regards to the inauguration of the PRC, one can imagine how the concrete-floor hosting grand 
scale propaganda and vibrant processions could unite the people and ‘transcend the particularity’ as 
Wu Hung phrases it (2005: 90). Herewith meant that the practise in Tiananmen Square seemingly 
partook in an effect of synergy, where the end was greater than the actual experience. As the 
helmsman, Mao Zedong, participated in the celebrations from atop Tiananmen – the place appraised 
most solemn in the whole parade - the barriers between the “civilian generals” and the commoners 
should begin to dissolve (Thornton, 2010). The people became both subjects and objects to a social-
ist community with an unambiguous origin centred in a majestic square, where they traditionally 
only featured as figurative subjects during imperial times (Hung, 2005). By means of this the CCP 
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gained its legitimacy through calculated iconoclasm where the reactionary, old order was annihi-
lated in favour of the socialist, new order (Hung, 2007; Hung, 2005). 
To accentuate this schism Mao suggested that ‘the people, and the people alone, are the motive 
forces of world history’ (Hung, 2005: 115). From the government’s point of view this statement 
simply manifests the nexus between government and citizen. A critic of the hegemonic discourse 
however, could debate that the socialist institution forged an imagined collective pronounced the 
people; a veil of illusion which explicitly promotes an internally homogeneous and externally 
bound nation. Moreover it equates the Chinese population with the source of power, but inherently 
that is an inconclusive notion.  Do the people hold power, or is it rather the one(s) holding the peo-
ple who hold(s) power? Another curious trait of the uniform conceptualisation of the people is the 
manner in which Mao becomes a prerequisite for the masses to identify themselves in the public 
space (Hung, 2005). By means of a well devised discourse and the repetitive nature of the pseudo-
religious Mao cult, the people becomes a constructed unit summoned on his call (Gittings, 1989). 
Another peculiar aspect of this relation, or dichotomy, between state and people exposed in the pa-
rades is the manner in which it is not the people constituting the visual focus, but rather the civilian 
generals. This observation was put forth by the professor Chang-Tai Hung, who argued that ‘the 
leaders were not the audience, they were the actors, while demonstrators acted as [the] audience’ 
(Hung, 2007: 430), and thus the presence of Mao and his fellow companions provided a target of 
appraisal to the people. 
Contemplating this unusual relation between government, place, and people one might consider 
how the political campaigns could effectually pose a threat to the public space explored in our chap-
ter on 1919. In accordance with theory ‘public space is often presented as an ideal of openness to-
ward which social groups struggle’ (Staeheli and Mitchell, 2009: 512), but when the authorities 
dictate who is, and who can be part of the public is it then relevant to entitle Tiananmen Square as a 
public space prior to 1989?  A central Party directive from 1955 paradoxically stipulate that ‘no 
single unit is allowed to come up with its own slogans’ (Hung, 2007: 424), but what means do the 
population then have to promote contestation and openness? 
If public space is constituted in the critical theorist Nancy Fraser’s perception of ‘parallel discursive 
arenas where members or subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter discourses to 
formulate alternative interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs’ (Mitchell and Staeheli, 
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2009: 513) then it seems crucial to explore the public spaces accessible since they arguably deter-
mine the prospects for idiosyncratic movements and for individuals to be recognised in and as part 
of the public space (Mitchell and Staeheli, 2009). With these critical perspectives in mind it seems 
pivotal to dissect the politics of space with respect to the Mao Zedong Cult; an instrumentalist tool 
which determined the spatial hierarchy, and gained impetus from the rousing slogans attributed to 
Mao himself, the supreme authority (Hung, 2007). 
Another pivotal theme in the processions was the aim and celebration of the united regions and na-
tionalities (Hung, 2007), something which will be explored further in the subsequent subchapter, 
The Geographical Unification through Beijing Time. Before expanding on that dimension of the 
CCP’s political handling of Tiananmen Square it nonetheless seems appropriate to explore the per-
ceptual meaning of architectural features since the monitoring system deciding on the destiny of the 
monuments erected in the Square arguably mirrors the CCP’s anxiety about its own existence 
(Hung, 2007). For this reason an analysis of the most important one - the Monument to the People’s 
Heroes – will be the focal point of the following subchapter. 
Before going into greater depth with the specifics, we concisely wish to comment on a latent causal-
mechanism behind this reframing of Tiananmen Square and the other artefacts. In keeping with 
Forest and Johnsons’ thought this paper advocates that the political actors attempt to exacerbate the 
inter-political conflict through monumental warfare. Doing so, they arguably encourage a shared 
public memory which necessarily shapes and draws up the boundaries of the collective identity 
(2011). 
The Monument to the People’s Heroes 
Traditionally war memorials are erected in order to commemorate the deeds of the dead, or the loss 
of the loved, but with the Chinese stele inaugurated on Labour Day the 1
st
 of May 1958 the political 
programme proved to perpetuate the symbolism of the project. The Monument to the People’s He-
roes had been commissioned and planned right from the very start of Mao’s claim to power (Dutton 
et al., 2008). With the immense construction situated in the centre of gravity – on the North South 
axis in Tiananmen Square – the 37.94 metre-tall obelisk crystallised the new political narrative 
rooted in a historical context. It was meant to embody the People’s Republic’s version of history up 
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to its inauguration. Tall and solid rather than low and arched like according to the old empiric trans-
lation of power, the features of the carved people at the bottom were devoid of any individualism as 
it originates from the tale of the mass. Their anonymous, triumphant poses rigid and well-rehearsed 
conveyed the heroic struggle for public emancipation and liberation.  The Monument also faced 
north, towards Tiananmen. This creation of a new literal and figurative centre of power within Bei-
jing deviated from the old dynastic formula of having power radiate outwards from the Forbidden 
City in straight lines through gates or gate-shaped structures (Hung, 2005; Dutton et al., 2008). 
Through socialist realism it not only represented a select glorious past, but it also alluded to the 
promise of a socialist future guided by the revolutionary movement characteristic of the new realm 
(Hung, 2001). In this context one might speculate as to why monuments are so commanding and 
forceful? Forest and Johnson suggests that the physical arrangements – here the Monument to the 
People’s Heroes - gain strategic legitimacy as the spatial framing transcends time; by virtue of its 
external nature the Monument influences the mental representation by bringing past images and 
mystical characters into the present (2002). As in the dystopian novel by George Orwell, 1984, this 
constitutive narrative of a socialist identity implicates an intelligent combination of factual epi-
sodes, folklore, and fiction since it otherwise would not echo the utopian dimension promised by 
the ruling echelon (Gittings, 1989). The PRC was supposed to outperform the rival representatives – 
in this context the capitalist world – but as Lagerkvist (2014) argues the battle was on the expense 
of the individual’s autonomy, and hence the Monument to the People’s Heroes innately compro-
mised the integrity of Chinese people in an artificially forged commemoration. 
In stone, the political apparatus manifested the new spatial hierarchy through eight reliefs on the 
Monument to the People’s Heroes depicting; ‘the Opium War; the Taiping Rebellion; the 1911 
Revolution; the May Fourth Movement; the May Thirtieth Movement of anti-colonial demonstra-
tions in 1925; the Nanchang Uprising; the War of Resistance Against Japan, with an emphasis on 
the Communists’ guerrilla warfare; and the Yangzi Crossing by the Red Army in the Civil War to 
defeat the Nationalists in south China’ (Hung, 2001: 466). In this analysis we are not going into fur-
ther detail regarding the specific events, but it is inevitable to consider the structured separation be-
tween ‘us’ and ‘them’ – here meaning the revolutionaries and the counterrevolutionaries - which 
offers both a mirror of reflection and a token of judgement. Everything connected with ‘us’ is en-
dorsed by the official historical account, where everything connected with ‘them’ is completely 
erased from existence. Implicitly this dichotomy, or binary system, creates a foundational ground 
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upon which the CCP stages itself in contrast to the constitutional factor of the dialectical-other. To 
employ McEwan’s phrasing ‘superiority cannot exist without an opposite’ (2009: 328), and so it 
can be argued that the spaces manifesting diversity become momentous in staging the new political 
order. Generating such destructive psychological maps the regular Chinese man or woman might - 
parallel to the black man in Fanon’s analysis of the colonial power - be ignorant to his/her servitude 
in the ideological web spun by the Party, and thus alienated from his/her consciousness (McEwan, 
2009). 
By introducing such a rigorous storyline infused with progressive chapters targeting the ultimate 
conquest of the CCP in 1949, all alternative versions and experiences seem to be conjured away in 
order to accommodate contemporary political demands (Hung, 2001). The grounds of this perspec-
tive is not far from the truism that ‘history is written by the conquerors’, but the subtle architectural 
planning of the Square is nevertheless a symbolic dialogue which successfully persuaded public 
opinion (Gittings, 1989). On this subject we would argue that it is an ideological strategy with defi-
nite material consequences, and with this frame of reference it is rather alluring to promote the no-
tion Banal Nationalism composed by the Professor of Social Sciences Michael Billig. According to 
his work Nationalism provides us with a perspective on how ideology shapes the human mind, and 
hoodwink it into accepting the social world as the true natural world (Billig, 1995). To reiterate the 
above, ideology operates to manipulate people, and put together an unquestionable world founded 
on common sense. Hereby the ruling power stimulates a collective existence established upon a 
progressively routinised process of remembering and forgetting. While having to consciously forgo 
questioning the ‘obvious’, these individual agents must uphold an identity constrained and bound, 
through external social fact(or)s. In Billig’s worded ideology it – if applied successfully – will in-
spire and secure a ‘continued existence upon a collective amnesia’ (Billig, 1995: 38). More con-
cretely this metaphor refers to the method by which symbolism – constituted in e.g. the Monument 
to the People’s Heroes - intentionally located, merge into the surrounding environment over time. 
Herewith people forget to mind the different perspectives characteristic to the local milieus, and so 
Billig argues for a ‘movement from symbolic mindfulness to mindlessness’ (Billig, 1995: 41). 
In prolongation to this the New China redefined itself – parallel to the Soviet Union – as the heart of 
an ideological empire (Forest and Johnson, 2002).  Contemplating the monitoring of this dense 
symbolic landscape surrounding Tiananmen Square and the Monument to the People’s Heroes, one 
plausible interpretation would suggest that the Party’s accumulation of symbolic capital is not 
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merely a way to triumph, but triumph in itself (Hung, 2005). Following this chain of thought the 
monumental complex of Tiananmen Square was deliberately utilised as a political instrument chan-
nelled to optimise the ideological framing of the state, but also of the individual (Ibid). Herewith the 
Monument of the People’s Heroes - architecturally operationalised as a dominant official space em-
bracing individual ideas and reminiscences of past events – exposes Mao’s vision of a deterministic 
narrative comprised of an independent linear motive (Ibid). With the ‘retrospective reconstruction 
of the past from a present vantage point’ (Hung, 2005: 29) the CCP strives to consolidate the fore-
ordained destination, communism, in the collective consciousness. 
 
As such the interplay between the physical, practical and ideological aspects of the Chinese political 
scenery proves helpful when searching for meaning touching on the intuitive patterns and latent re-
lationships regarding the contestation of place. With Mao’s inscription on the front of the stele - 
‘eternal glory to the people’s heroes’- the Monument can be read as an example of how the state 
metaphorically gave birth to a new public (Hung, 2005), notwithstanding this carefully designed 
picture of a civic community proves fairly intrusive. It is a social construct introduced into a pre-
existing spatial context, and so it forced a profound reconceptualisation of social as well as political 
affairs; all which in nature are contestable.     
As such the symbolically dense scene of Tiananmen Square was altered into ‘a site of visual pro-
duction and presentation’ (Hung, 2005: 9), which explicitly articulated the visions of the CCP. In 
this context one may perhaps wonder whether or not the residents of Beijing internalised the recon-
structed memory of the past and the displaced mirage constituting the future? Answering this ques-
tion is from our position as outsiders is unthinkable, but it is certainly appealing to follow the pro-
tests in 1989 since the ideological thickness becomes far less definite.    
 
The geographical unification through Beijing time 
 
In continuation of the inauguration of the PRC, the Party not only replaced the nationalist capital 
Nanjing with Beijing as mentioned earlier, but it also adopted the somewhat controversial Beijing 
Time. In effect, the New China officially started to tag on eight hours in front of Greenwich Mean 
Time, and so it abandoned the clocks adjusted to the five time zones spanned by the territorial map 
(Dutton et al., 2008). Herewith the CCP arguably unified the people of the infant nation through an 
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artificial time-regulation centred in Tiananmen Square, and ‘thus from 1949 onward China would 
awaken and rise to the ticktock of Party time’ (Dutton et al., 2008:16). In this regard some scholars 
underscore the dismissal of cultural and regional diversity (Hung, 2005 and Calhoun, 1997), but as 
Michael Dutton acknowledges the CCP not only brought death and dismay to its competitors; it also 
aroused new life to its allies (2008). In addition one can imagine how the implementation of Beijing 
Time had both its social disadvantages and its political advantages; the latter enhanced by the com-
bined restructuring of the representational dimensions of Tiananmen Square. 
 
Besides the obvious symbolism of a synchronised socialist force, the notion of time also carries 
great importance in Chinese culture. Reading Hung Wu’s interpretation of time keeping and time 
telling in the dynastic periods, one acquires a foundational understanding of how the emperor’s di-
vinity was channelled by means of monumentality. Literally speaking this monumentality was – 
according to Wu - expressed through architecture and sound in the drum tower and the bell tower 
situated on Beijing’s central axis (2003). Following Wu’s mind mapping, time keeping was the se-
cret science guarded and exercised by the emperor to ‘regulate seasons, months, days, and hours’ 
(Ibid: 107). The practice of time keeping was carried out in the shadows of mystery behind the gates 
to the Forbidden City, where no commoner was allowed access. Adopting Barbara Adam’s percep-
tion of time keeping, it furthermore legitimised the emperor – and similarly it must legitimise the 
CCP - as the keeper of collective memory (Adam, 2006). Time telling on the other hand was an in-
strument applied to convey a uniform timetable to the public. It was not an expression of time, as 
most Westerners know it; rather it was ‘an official schedule of projected operations and recurring 
events’ (Ibid: 108) such as announcing and facilitating the nightly curfew (7pm – 5am) together 
with the hours of the night watch. To further reiterate, it is a tradition of a two-pronged symbolic 
monumentalism encompassing a concealed and a displayed power; a perspective which could po-
tentially also be projected in e.g. the Monument to the People’s Heroes discussed earlier.  
 
Apart from being positioned on the central axis - materially represented by virtue of the two towers 
- the dimension of time was subtly integrated into the city’s symbolic arrangement. Operating the 
Drum tower and the Bell tower outside Di’anmen8, the imperial power could debatably be transmit-
                                                             
8
 Di’anmen translates into ‘Gate of Earthly Peace’ 
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ted from inside the spiritual domain behind Tiananmen into the public space via these architectural 
installations (Hung, 2005). 
Arranging the token of static spaces in a temporal, dynamic composition the emperor figuratively 
synchronised the earthly and heavenly movements. By extension of this ceremonial practise the 
emperor engendered cosmic order, and in doing so he could ‘internalise the intrinsic movement of 
the universe [...] to rule without using force’ (Ibid: 113). 
These cultural perspectives could immediately seem without reference to the present report; how-
ever we would argue the opposite. Indeed we find it pertinent as there ostensibly are quite a few 
paradoxical incidents - linked with the way of the dynasties and the mode of the PRC - revealing the 
inconsistency of the ideological narrative constructed post 1949. In all aspects the CCP strived to 
divorce itself from the reactionary past affiliated with the dynasties and nationalists by alienating 
the structures which supposedly facilitated the antagonistic division of social classes (Dutton et al., 
2008). Nonetheless we would advocate that the personification of the socialist authority takes the 
same form as prior ruling powers; the transparent, omnipresent face of one man embedded in mate-
rial practises. 
 
The new China might be embossed in Tiananmen Square to commemorate the founding of the PRC, 
but focusing on time and the temporal relations of the Square it is possible to identify openings for 
alternative perspectives. As alluded to in the previous paragraph Tiananmen Square is historically 
the originator of public time, and hence time is inherently a crucial dimension of the CCP’s spatial 
framing of the site. Encapsulating the process of nature in a deterministic timetable of human design 
– here referred to the Beijing Time - the CCP arguably aim for the ultimate compression of time to 
exercise control over the individual and the collective, but also over the space. 
In accordance with theory ‘invariable time [...] superimposed on living systems’ tend to coerce the 
living, and so humans have to adapt to the directional ticking (Adam, 2006: 123). Herewith people 
follow the cyclical repetition of time as it interacts with the spatial sense-making partly structured 
by the Party, and thusly the political time proves to be closely interwoven with the political framing 
of Tiananmen Square. Implementing a universal time the CCP subtly incorporates what we previ-
ously called time keeping and time telling into the realm of the PRC, and hence it also exercises a 
concealed and a displayed power in keeping with former emperors. 
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In this regard a fascinating observation made by Wu is that the Drum tower and the Bell tower are 
respectively 46.7 and 47.9 meters tall, and would be seen in day and heard at night. Herewith the 
power relation between the emperor and the populace would prevail and be reproduced through a 
latent ritual due to the omnipresence of the central leadership (Adam, 2006). Equal with Mao, the 
emperor could – if not observe his subjects directly from behind a portrait – then at least reach them 
through the medium of sound. 
In connection with the above we would in retrospective argue that there seem to be certain parallels 
between the new structural changes and the former imperial conceptualisation of time and space. 
Concretely we allude to the control of the population through regulation and management of time 
by means of an externally implemented structure materialised in an imposing monumentalism. 
 
Conclusively the matter of time is a curious phenomenon. In pursuance of the historian Mircea Eli-
ade’s explanation of rituals as key to capture - or perhaps better phrased - freeze time (Adam, 
2006), we would propose that the socialist administration enforced Beijing Time since it by virtue 
of the national and bi-annual parades etc. could entrench a sense of ‘eternity in the present’ (Ibid: 
121). Put differently the CCP could allegorically create a timeless space in Tiananmen Square con-
sidering that this is where time itself originates from. Thusly, the perhaps most challenging factor of 
the Party’s existence – the disappearance of the present as the clock ticks on – can be circumvent by 
means of a novel absoluteness. 
 
Sub conclusion on 1949 
 
In short the chapter on 1949 offers an analysis exploring the ideological initiatives utilised to ap-
propriate, and subsequently dominate Tiananmen Square, contrasting its meaning to the traditional 
one. Inasmuch as the “face” of the socialist institution immanently reveals itself in the portrait of 
Mao, the Chinese Communist Party annexed the site in prolongation of the symbolism permeating 
the new framing of the People’s Republic of China. Herewith the contestation was arguably si-
lenced temporarily, as the spatial framing was carried out in a highly exclusive environment. In this 
regard it is interesting to notice how the dynastic practise of concealed and displayed power was 
intimately utilised in the course of appropriation, and thereby the CCP’s paradoxical alignment with 
the prior leadership is revealed. 
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Chapter on 1989: Attack of the Publics 
 
At its core the following chapter will address the publics’ practical utilisation of Tiananmen Square 
to convey their political demands by means of protests, demonstrations and physical occupation of 
the place. The chapter engages with the Monument to the People’s Heroes in relation to the death of 
Zhou Enlai and the erection of Mao’s Mausoleum, as these two events altered the people’s relation 
to the Monument and their perceptual meaning of the Square.  
Inasmuch we will be looking at the contestation between the portrait of Mao hanging from Tianan-
men, and the Goddess of Democracy constructed by the students, as this binary system inherently 
represent the state and the publics. The above mentioned practical methods applied by the students, 
will be outlined in relation to theory of contested place together with how space and meaning is 
produced and altered through domination and (re)appropriation. 
 
Appropriation of the Monument to the People’s Heroes 
 
With the death of the Premier Zhou Enlai in 1976, the constructed memory of the People’s Republic 
of China arguably stood trial. People were mournful, and hence no less than two million Chinese 
citizens defied the socialist authorities’ prohibition of public memorial processions, and gathered in 
Tiananmen Square to mourn the pragmatic icon (Panda, 1999).  
In effect the ultra-leftist Gang of Four
9
 had attempted to impose a ban on the sales of white crepe 
paper, but as the day went on it showed to be futile (Gittings, 1989). White, traditional paper 
wreaths appeared on the Monument to the People’s Heroes together with a large portrait of the 
Premier; the latter directly opposing the official portrait of Mao Zedong communicating an un-
equivocal, iconoclastic message (Teiwes and Sun, 2004).   
 
This explicit challenge of the hierarchical order coincided with the start of Quingming in early 
April
10
 which only seemed to stir the publics sense of righteousness; they marched to defend the 
traditional call for commemoration (Panda, 1999). As such it must primarily be seen as a procession 
                                                             
9 A political faction constituted by four Party officials: Mao’s wife Jian Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and 
Hongwen 
10 A traditional festival devoted to ancestral veneration and mourning 
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with patriotic connotations rather than a democratic resistance movement; people wished to pay 
their respect in keeping with the old cultural codes. Wasserstrom, however, also deciphered an ob-
jection toward the Gang of Four upon their malevolence exposed during the Cultural Revolution
11
  
(1990). 
 
One of the main explanatory factors in regards to the spontaneous demonstrations in Tiananmen 
Square, was the general feeling of indifference with which the Party had silenced and censored 
Zhou Enlai’s death (Teiwes and Sun, 2004). As the publics decided to visit the Monument to the 
People’s Heroes - the official symbol of the people (Dutton et al., 2008) - in tribute to the respect-
able Premier, an individual who had been criticised by the ideological machine during the Cultural 
Revolution it impassioned the currents of political tension. A curious observation in this regard was 
made by the public security leader of Beijing, Liu Chuanxin, who claimed, that the improvised 
marches and banned paper wreaths ‘reflect severe class struggles’ (Teiwes and Sun, 2004: 217). 
  
Intrinsically the unanticipated amplitude of the demonstrations gave impetus to a well-founded 
vexation and uncertainty, which urged the autocratic management to take action. On that note the 
Square was emptied to the sound of cannons, and only the - now bloody - Monument to the Peo-
ple’s Heroes was left on the surface of the paved expanse of the Square (Hung, 2005). Herewith the 
Monument seceded itself from the constructed narrative depicted by the state, and acquired a new 
perceptual meaning. The public was from thereon both figuratively and literally tied to the Monu-
ment by blood, and so the events of the illicit mourning and subsequent defiance of the authorities 
in 1976 remained in the collective memory of the publics.  
The official symbolism of the monument had been displaced, and herewith it gained a slot in ordi-
nary people’s reinterpretations and association with the site. Just like the individuals that had been 
affected in 1976 protests, the Monument was also figuratively and symbolically hemmed in on all 
sides by the watchful authorities (Hung, 1991) 
 
The ailing Chairman Mao was to die a mere five months after the 1976 demonstration (Gittings, 
1989). In addendum, Mao’s mausoleum was constructed and inaugurated - disrupting the open 
scene - in the critical space between Tiananmen and the Monument to the People’s Heroes. Facing 
                                                             
11 Political campaign spurred by Mao Zedong with the aim of preserving “true” communist ideology  
Page 37 of 52 
 
Tiananmen it created a new southern border of Tiananmen Square, and as such it enveloped the 
Monument within the four structures that made up the figurative and symbolic walls of the square 
(Hung, 2005). As Hung proposed this captured the people - now inseparable with the Monument to 
the People’s Heroes - in an allegorical prison. The publics were checked in the political game of 
chess, continuously under surveillance; observed from beyond by the all-seeing-eye of Mao ele-
vated above Tiananmen (2005).  
Additionally the mausoleum took on the role of the representative of the PRC’s revolutionary past. 
Doing so it firstly left tangible contradiction of having Mao’s embalmed body housed opposite his 
“living” embodiment in the omnipresent portrait across Tiananmen Square; and secondly, leaving 
the Monument to the People’s Heroes in the middle of the Square to the living. As a side note, it is 
worth mentioning, that the Monument incarnated the only place with unrestricted access, and so in 
1977, common citizens of Beijing were not allowed inside any of the buildings encircling the 
Square (Hung, 2005). Immediately this is reminiscent of the dynastic era’s isolation and secrecy, 
but what the official rationale behind these restraints is, would call for divination. A persuasive ex-
planation would perhaps insinuate, that the spontaneous assemblies could aggravate the anxiety of 
the CCP. If the publics engaged and appropriated the rest of what constituted Tiananmen Square, 
the collective identity, rooted and shaped around the shared memories indoctrinated by the state 
made known in the chapter on 1949, might crackle into unstable, fragmented pieces. Inherently, this 
would pose a palpable threat to the political narrative dictating permanence and Party servility. 
 
In 1978 a series of economical reforms were implemented in China. These partially separated poli-
tics from the contemporary bureaucratic machinery, but they also divorced the social society from 
the omnipresent state, and so, according to the anthropologist, Sullivan,  the reforms ‘gave impetus 
to “civil sovereignty”’ (1990: 130).  
Since the contestation of Tiananmen Square is the cynosure of this project, we do not go into further 
detail regarding the content, nor the political reasons behind the reforms. However, it is pertinent to 
acknowledge the impact these reforms had on the definition of borders in contemporary China; it so 
happened that the figurative limits of the state were significantly degraded (Gittings, 1989). Cate-
gorically this evoked China’s interaction with the surrounding world, and so students could among 
others exchange experiences with their westerly counterparts (Panda, 1999). 
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With this opening up of the country’s figurative borders came an exposure to Western concepts of 
organized, political democracy. Even though there were campaigns by the Chinese Communist 
party in the early Eighties to try and curb the influence of these imported concepts, tens of thou-
sands of students and scholars had been out of the country to study and travel (Panda, 1999). An 
observable example of this overseas influence later took form in the reproduced form of the God-
dess of Democracy, which we will address in the subsequent chapter.  
 
The political movement in 1989, initially sparked off by the death of the Party General Secretary 
Hu Yaobang, collided with the 70th anniversary of the May Fourth demonstration in 1919 (Solin-
ger, 1989; Chan, 1999). Initially the publics demanded ‘a more open political system, freedom and 
democratization, an end to dictatorship, legal guarantees of citizen rights, and a free press’ (Solin-
ger, 1989:624), but during the protests the perhaps most prominent issues became  officials’ corrup-
tion and open dialogue (Ibid.). 
During the protests the publics had tried their best, to fully customise the Monument to the People’s 
Heroes to suit the movement (Hung, 1991; Panda, 1999). White wreaths and flowers lay at its base, 
and the portrait of Hu and a banner proclaiming “Long Live The People” covered Mao’s engraving 
of “Eternal Glory To The People’s Heroes”. This deliberate juxtaposition of using the image of Hu 
Yaobang - the personification of a new era leader - against the image of Chairman Mao - the per-
sonification of the old era leader by using the Monument - developed into using the Goddess of 
Democracy  (Hung, 1991).  As a symbol that was undeniably associated with the United States of 
America; China’s theo-political antithesis, it would first be used as a figurehead for the democratic 
demands of the protestors and later, as the inspiration for the self-made Goddess of Democracy. 
 
Goddess of Democracy 
 
When demonstrators took over Tiananmen Square in the spring of 1989, a symbolic centre dis-
placement occurred. Tiananmen Square and the Monument to People’s Heroes were symbols of the 
state’s power and the unmistakable authority to create a convenient history according to its ideo-
logical mindset. As illustrated in the previous chapters, the Square had been modified deliberately 
since the inauguration of the People’s Republic of China to represent the CCP’s mapping of the 
Chinese community as one symbiotic whole, but with the civil protests in 1989 the orthodox ideo-
logical stand was somewhat deteriorating (Saich, 1990). Through iconoclastic political street thea-
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tre, the publics interfered in the sphere of story writing, and hence the civil society arguably dis-
tanced itself from the government (Esherick and Wasserstrom, 1990). As a side note, it is notewor-
thy how the Chinese civil society - constituted by state-independent, voluntarily founded organisa-
tions - was of minimal importance in contemporary China; every aspect of everyday life seemed to 
be mediated by the omnipresent state. Immediately this note might seem somewhat arbitrary, but it 
is imperative to recognise the obvious advantages such organisations might furnish, facilitating the 
demonstrations with a stronger administrative base (Esherick and Wasserstrom, 1990). 
 
To return focus, this newly created, undefined space gave ground for the emergence of a spontane-
ous popular consciousness, which eventually could - or perhaps better phrased, had the potential to - 
sabotage the autocratic hegemony constituted by the state (Saich, 1990; Sullivan, 1990). This re-
placement of the state’s representation by the students’ in public commemoration leant a sense of 
instability to the centring of symbolism (Chan, 1999). The centre of gravity was figuratively ele-
vated and the steady stream of petitions to the Party was audible, as the protesters promoted resis-
tance and free speech in Tiananmen Square (Hung, 2005).  
 
Unprecedented in Chinese history, the protesters devised a novel monument, the Goddess of De-
mocracy (Wasserstrom, 1990). The appropriation of this figure was just that, appropriation. Creat-
ing a new gravitational field with the Goddess of Democracy as its centre, the publics attracted new 
attention to their cause promoting openness and transparency. The statue made a great symbol - 
build in white plastic foam - visible from the distance, and so it awakened new interest for the 
cause. Built in four sections for ease of assembly, it was transported from the Art Academy where it 
was created to Tiananmen Square.  With its sudden appearance, people who had otherwise started 
to leave due to flagging interest responded positively, rejoining the protesting masses (Calhoun, 
1997). 
 
A viewpoint that one could take up in this context is, that the harnessing of buzzwords - such as 
democracy and freedom - were just borrowed icons that the dissenting public had endorsed, and 
brought home from overseas. However, to assume that the Goddess of Democracy was simply an 
early symptom of Chinese plagiarism would testify a parochial attitude towards the protesters. In 
other words, it would be misleading to delineate the Goddess of Democracy directly with the west-
ern ideological camp. She truly was a complex mixture between Western ideals, immanently re-
Page 40 of 52 
 
vealed in the esteemed Statue of Liberty, and vernacular assessments originating from Chinese tra-
dition (Esherick and Wasserstrom, 1990; Calhoun, 1997). To exemplify the latter, there was a great 
similarity to the giant white statues issued in the Party’s National Day Parades back in the Sixties. 
This anachronistic representation of recognizable traits, some earnest and some ironic, leant itself to 
the air of performance in the public space (Esherick and Wasserstrom, 1990).  
 
Of itself this practical utilisation of conventional and dissident symbolism marked a tangible paral-
lel to the CCP’s practical modelling of Tiananmen Square, and hence the substance in the publics’ 
actions was the deliberate participation in claiming the site for their own in the face of governmen-
tal adversity (Hershkovitz, 1993). Protesters usurped traditional rites and state ceremonies upon 
which they could improvise ‘to make it serve subversive ends’ (Esherick and Wasserstrom, 1990: 
840), and thusly the audience became a part of the drama. Gathering around the Goddess of Democ-
racy stationed in symbolic opposition to the portrait of the helmsman, Mao Zedong, the publics ef-
fectively italicised their ideologi-
cal position in prolongation of 
their practical management. 
 Confronting Mao’s portrait the 
rising Goddess of Democracy 
acquired symbolic merits on par 
with the other political figures 
and monuments in Tiananmen 
Square, and so the publics appro-
priation - at least temporarily - 
overshadowed the official narra-
tive of the state as they became 
representatives of the symbolic 
centre (Chan, 1999).   
 
 
Figure 2; “Statue of the Goddess of Democracy in Tiananmen Square” (Hung, 2005: 17). 
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When compared to the Monument to the People’s Heroes - a static stone memorial in opposition to 
a past realm, erected for the dead - the Goddess of Democracy was a relatable symbol for the living 
born out the people’s own making (Hung, 1991). As the Goddess of Democracy emerged in 
Tiananmen Square, it represented a structure carried and retained by the masses; a monument that 
could preserve the individual’s integrity through the collective actions of the protesting publics 
(Sullivan, 1990). Put differently the monument gave space for representation of the individual, as it 
was a product of their own actions - the Goddess was created by the protesters, for the protesters - 
and as such it was more relatable to the individual than the state-constructed monuments. 
 
By virtue, the uprising channeled discombobulated signals. This is undeniably exhibited in the vari-
ous journal articles where scholars diverge on the question of the nature of 1989. Is it a revolution-
ary displacement of the collective consciousness, or is it rather a pluralistic democratic movement? 
Perhaps it is neither of the two, but notwithstanding it is relevant to reflect upon the integral mean-
ings, as these are mirrored in the practical use of the Goddess of Democracy.  
With reference to the first proposal, it is curious to witness how the publics employed a monument. 
Typically, monuments would be constructed to furnish permanence, but inherently permanence 
seems alien to the idea of revolution, which after all, means to rebel against supposed “permanence” 
(Hung, 1991: 113). Following Wu Hung’s chain of thought, the construction of the Goddess of 
Democracy effectively announced the end of revolution and the beginning of a “permanent” order 
(Hung, 1991).  
 
Pondering the “future perspectives” of the Goddess of Democracy, people recognised, that she 
would potentially be demolished by the state; as it happened. Some, like e.g. one sculptor, even ex-
pected her to be pulverised, but predicted a positive outcome ‘they’ll have to smash her into pieces, 
thereby exposing their anti-democratic faces’ (Ibid: 113). The Goddess of Democracy was not ex-
actly supposed to bring permanence, but rather she was meant to; firstly, create an imposing figure 
for the protesters to follow, and secondly, employ a dissent inteligensia to lure the red, socialist fox 
out of its cave. Hereby - openly caught by thousands of voyeurs - the state would have to waive its 
secret diplomacy. The publics would have direct evidence of their assumptions regarding the true 
nature of the state. 
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Practical use of Tiananmen Square 
 
The large protests that took place in May in 1989 were semi-organised by students, inasmuch that a 
system of democratically elected student representatives was established, and served to function as 
various governing bodies of the protest. In this sense the demonstrating students of ’89 were differ-
ent from their predecessors of 1919 – and an important thing to note here, is that May in 1989 
marked the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement, and was the first time public dis-
sent of such large scale had inadvertently been a location for expression (Panda 1999). The students 
furthermore led an array of practical approaches to occupying the Square and portraying their dis-
content, as we will discuss below. 
On the 13
th
 of May in 1989 the demonstrators embarked upon a hunger strike; a conclusive symbol 
of self-denial. In not attaining their basic needs - such as eating - the demonstrators literally per-
tained themselves to self-sacrifice, for the cause of the greater good. A selfless action that was cen-
tered around the Monument to the People’s Heroes, which additionally gave it another layer of 
complexity (Chan, 1999). News of the hunger strike was apparently what swayed the general non-
actively participating observing citizens onto the side of the protesters.  
 
The student demonstrators formed a small settlement on the Square, rather than staying in their 
“proper” parts of Beijing in their campus districts. They took control of the space for their own uses 
by implementing amenities such as rain shelters, toilet and sleeping facilities on the normally barren 
location, dealing with and organising both their own demonstrators and the visiting news media. 
 Moreover banners and posters with political epitaphs were hung; an example of which read 
‘Chairman Mao, old man, are you weeping now?’ (Hershkovitz, 1993: 413). In keeping with well-
rehearsed organisational strategies, the protesters actively related themselves to the ancestral pro-
testers in 1919 (Wasserstrom, 1990).  The physical occupation of Tiananmen Square by the publics 
during the protests of 1989 showed strong signs of contestation between the publics and the state, as 
they struggled for the power of the place.  
The following quote from Esherick and Wasserstrom captures the meaning of contestation as fol-
lowed through the inauguration of Tiananmen Square 1949, and the consequences this lead to 
through the 1989 demonstrations: 
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‘Some public rituals are always necessary, and in this event, there is always the danger that stu-
dents or other actors will usurp the stage and turn the official ritual into their own political theater 
[…] With all this theater, the students appealed to a tradition of principled dissent and revolution-
ary action that the party itself had legitimized and mythologized in the attempt to claim such theater 
as its own.’ (Esherick and Wasserstrom, 1992: 51-52). 
 
The state and the publics in this sense utilised Tiananmen Square as the stage upon which they per-
form their own political theatre; however as the stage only allows for one play, one political theatre, 
to be performed at a time, contestation occurs as a result of the ideological clashes portrayed 
through the two political theatres. In retrospective it is curious how contestation of the place has 
been dominated through the theatrical stage of social development centred in Tiananmen Square. 
Large parades and shows of supremacy were - as voiced in the chapter on 1949 - crucial parts of the 
Maoist style of ritualised demonstrations; especially in the Party’s heyday in the years immediately 
following their inauguration. With 70th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement the CCP had in-
vited the leader of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, to join the official celebrations (Esherick and 
Wasserstrom, 1992). 
By upstaging and stealing the thunder from the authorities, this became a show of the power strug-
gle between the publics and the Party.  In this case, the undermined authorities were forced to settle 
for using less meaningful, less powerful locations for Gorbachev’s visit – an unmistakable cleaving 
of official state actions and those of the people (Ibid). 
 
By the end of May in 1989, over a million people occupied the Square despite declaration of martial 
law, Mao’s portrait had been spattered with paint, and the Goddess of Democracy statue had ap-
peared in the centre of the square. Within the first week of June, the Square had been forcibly 
cleared, with the estimated death toll ranging from the hundreds to the thousands. (Hung, 1991; 
Lagerkvist, 2014) In accordance with the concept of contested space as presented by Phillips, the 
violent acts enacted by the government towards the protesters of 1989 portray a clear sign of contes-
tation over the Square during its occupation. 
 
Much like how the Party had to project the image of a revolutionary selfless mass of people who 
fought for China before the CCP’s inauguration, the students had to demonstrate their own willing-
ness to lay themselves down for the cause of change and democracy.  As thought upon by the stu-
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dents who carried out hunger strikes, selflessness was the act that would garner empathy and the 
attention of citizens in Beijing who observed but were not active in the demonstrations. This is what 
prompted the students to build the near-sacrificial figure of the Goddess and occupy the Square de-
spite threat of bodily harm (Hung, 1991). Through the physical practises of occupation, raising the 
Goddess of Democracy, parades and waving banners and engaging with political posters, the pub-
lics were arguably attempting to yet again re-appropriate the meaning of Tiananmen Square. The 
military intervention that came to ensue, however, came to impose upon the publics the complete 
domination of the space by the state (Chan, 1999).  
 
Sub-conclusion 
 
Succinctly, Chinese society was enduring a crisis of memory. The geographical and sociological 
imaginations constructed and controlled by the ideological machinery, were openly exposed as the 
democratic protesters challenged the coercive powers of the commanding system. Marchers gath-
ered in Tiananmen Square to voice suppressed frustration regarding the exclusive political practises 
neglecting the demands of the people, and herewith the citizens of Beijing arguably reclaimed a lost 
identity masked in the discursive jungle of half-truths. Through the practical utilisation and interac-
tion with Tiananmen Square the publics shake the perceptual meaning of the Square in an attempt to 
appropriate it. 
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The Trinitarian Relation: The End of the 
Third Age  
 
Upon the conclusion of our three primary chapters on 1919, 1949 and 1989 the subsequent para-
graphs will discuss contestation in relation to the production of Tiananmen Square. Concisely we 
target the points retrieved in the respective chapters, and hence focus will be on the interaction be-
tween spatial changes, practical use, and the metaphysical manifestations that this may lead to. In 
doing so we draw upon the various scholars utilised in the exploration of our analytical and theo-
retical framework. 
As such the aim of this discussion is to substantiate the understanding of the perceptual meaning of 
Tiananmen Square which we contemplate in order to answer our research question: How has the 
perceptual meaning of Tiananmen Square as a contested place changed from 1919 onwards?  
 
Appropriation and Domination  
 
In The Production of Place, Lefebvre writes that space cannot simply disappear – if it was the case, 
we would experience no permeation of spaces or contestations for that matter (1991). Rather, spaces 
are interwoven and succeed each other by reconstructing prior meaning, as it seems to be the case 
with Tiananmen Square that as a place has transgressed through several contestations between pub-
lics and the government. Here, however, it becomes important to draw upon the concept of domi-
nated space that is in direct disclosure with that of appropriation of space. A space that has been al-
tered and negotiated by the practice of the state and by technology that enables physical transforma-
tion of space, is considered to be dominated. For space to be dominated it is in this sense necessary 
to physically reshape the preceding space into a ‘usually closed, sterilized, emptied out’ place (Le-
febvre, 1991 : 165). 
It seems appropriate in this regard to argue that prior to the end of the dynastic era, the space that 
now constitutes Tiananmen Square, was indeed dominated by the emperor as it was empty and iso-
lated from the public. Continuing through time, however, the republican era from 1912 proved to 
re-construct the spatiality of Beijing, offering more flexibility of movement to the public. This ar-
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guably seemed to provide the May Fourth Movement with the opportunity to re-appropriate the 
Square to serve their needs as investigated in the chapter on 1919. Jumping to the revolution of 
1949 that brought the CCP into power it is imperative to note how Lefebvre disputes that appropria-
tion and domination does not exclude one another. Rather they occur concurrently, but eventually 
domination is expected to exceed appropriation (Lefebvre, 1991). Taking this as point of departure 
we would argue that the state in 1949 dominated the space through exerting its own political power 
over the Square, although it did not physically close the space to the public. Consequently, the ideo-
logical prospects of the May Fourth Movement remained imbued in the Square, and the theory of 
appropriation thus remains relevant as the socialist apparatus - immediately after its inauguration - 
embarked upon a voyage of meaning making. Interpreting the events of 1989, we ponder how the 
publics attempted to re-appropriate the Square, but in spite of their efforts the protests were shut 
down by the coercive practice of the government. Perceptually the state proceeded to dominate the 
space by adapting a strategy of social enclosure and depoliticisation; concretely, flower beds, digi-
talisation and a more disciplinary surveillance was adopted (Thornton, 2010). In regards to the con-
testation of Tiananmen Square it is debatable whether the autonomous protests of 1989 ignited new 
hope or completed the power of the state. Did it sow a new awareness of independency in the con-
sciousness of the publics, or did it in fact disillusion their beliefs of a people’s state tolerant to po-
litical opposition? 
 
Meaning making 
 
Considering the meaning consigned to Tiananmen Square, it is relevant to discuss how contestation 
is expressed, and eventually by what means. Immediately this calls for cultural mediation as people 
- ‘transform the mundane phenomenon of the material world into a world of significant symbols of 
which they give meaning and attach value’ (Jackson, 1989: 47). Another alternative perspective 
proposed, explains cultural mediation as an instinctive effort to exceed the unilluminated bounda-
ries of human existence (Adam, 2006), and so both judge the externalisation of knowledge as a way 
to channel meaning beyond the presence. 
In relation to Tiananmen Square it is imperative to acknowledge the asymmetry ingrained in the 
contestation regarding the cultural mediation, as the socialist institution indoctrinates and coerce its 
subjects via the political domination of the place. The civic society is not a homogenous entity, but 
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rather a fragmented collection of deviating subgroups and dynamic identities constituted in various 
publics as indicated in the chapter on 1919. In this fashion the organisational prospects of the peo-
ple are ambiguous, where the socialist institutions conversely command the undivided capacity of 
the state (Jackson, 1989). Herewith the Party vehicle effectively runs down all resistance as proved 
in 1989 with the massacre. However, this administrative advantage might diminish, or eventually 
vanish completely, as the protests also embodied a genuine challenge to establish spatial hierarchy 
and social order. 
Nevertheless, having to evaluate the perceptual meaning of Tiananmen Square can be troublesome, 
as any interpretation or judgement exclusively relies on the scale of analysis. Firstly, the spatial pat-
terns, or perhaps better phrased perceptual structure of earthly objects, depend on the disciplinary 
lens applied. Secondly, the political and social patterns orbiting Tiananmen Square are so complex, 
that it almost seems futile to navigate in the multilayered perceptual structure of intellectual net-
works. 
On this matter it is demanding to determine focus, and moreover to determine the limits of one’s 
focus. As alluded to throughout the project the contestation is not purely one dimensional, and 
hence nothing seems to be directly corollary; one-to-one scale. Since we to all intents and purposes 
search for meaning vested and conveyed in Tiananmen Square the literary scholar Jonathan Culler 
captures the fundamental issues in the quote ‘Meaning is context bound, but context is boundless’ 
(Culler, 2009: 91). In elaboration of this statement a paragraph dedicated to our theoretical frame-
work - forged together by the physical, practical and metaphysical aspects of production of space - 
seems relevant as we delved into the multifaceted analytical approach.  
If we were only to have focused on a singular aspect, it would easily become a very narrow project. 
By applying the three, however, it better captures the depth of contestation, and how it fundamen-
tally overlaps the dimensions of time and space. Had the research only explored e.g. the physical 
world it would have been more of an architectural project, and not so much a social scientific one. 
In order to fully understand contestation from a social scientific perspective, we therefore propose 
the importance of the versatile approach that we have come to use, and as discovered through our 
three chapters it becomes clear that they are indeed interlinked; implicitly and explicitly. 
Through the operationalisation of the physical, metaphysical and practical in the chapters on 1919, 
‘49 and ‘89 respectively, we have attempted to show the depth of contestation. In this sense, we 
propose that this specific theoretical method of analysis could beneficially be utilised in future stud-
ies on contested place.  
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Conclusion 
 
Considering the occurrences of the selected historical junctures we identified what we would postu-
late to be a circular development of space.  With the opening of Tiananmen Square in the aftermath 
of dynastic era’s dissolution, China underwent a metaphysical journey through which the publics 
were finally capable of interacting and portraying their own ideals in the Square. Put differently, the 
rupture gave impetus to a paradigmatic shift from the sacred to the profane; herewith the publics 
could disengage their collective memory from the fang of the emperor and thus appropriate a novel 
identity within the opened, social space of Tiananmen Square.  
In the light of the revolution of 1949, the newly constituted Chinese Communist Party annexed the 
space and claimed its public collective memory to serve as the axis mundi of the regime. By virtue 
of ideology, the Party arguably inspirited a hitherto-unknown constellation of social relations that 
ignited a new paradigmatic shift from the profane to that of a political cult revolving around the 
helmsman, Mao Zedong. 
Lastly, as bookends to complete the circle, we invigorate the importance of the 1989 protests exer-
cised in Tiananmen as it seemed to function as one of the primary manifestations of contestation 
post 1949. On that note, the political atmosphere surrounding the environment of Tiananmen 
Square was altered and hence a third paradigmatic shift ensued; here from a political cult to a state 
of limbo in which the place is contested openly. 
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